The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Theorem establishes that a particular class of auction and public-decision mechanisms, in which each participant pays an amount equal to the cost their presence imposes on every other participant, makes truthful reporting of one's own private valuation a dominant strategy for every participant. Named for William Vickrey, Edward Clarke and Theodore Groves, it is a foundational result of mechanism design generalizing the earlier Vickrey second-price auction to settings with many goods and many possible outcomes.
Facts
StatementEvery mechanism in the VCG family is truthful: bidding the true valuation is a dominant strategy. 1 Classification
Statement FormCharacterization Theorem 1 Connections
Has Statement Form
In Branch
Source Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (Wikipedia)
Sources
1. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (Wikipedia)
Introduction
Every mechanism in the VCG family is a truthful mechanism, that is, a mechanism where bidding the true valuation is a dominant strategy.
In Group: Mechanism Design, Article text
In mechanism design, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is a generic truthful mechanism for achieving a socially optimal solution whenever monetary transfers are available.
In Branch: Game Theory, Article text
In mechanism design, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is a generic truthful mechanism for achieving a socially optimal solution whenever monetary transfers are available.
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