Any outcome achievable by a mechanism in which participants might strategically misreport their private information can also be achieved by an incentive-compatible mechanism in which truthful reporting is each participant's best strategy. A foundational simplifying result of mechanism design theory.
Facts
StatementAny social choice outcome implementable by some mechanism in which participants may have an incentive to misreport their private information can also be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism, one in which truthful reporting is a best response for every participant. 1 Classification
Statement FormCharacterization Theorem 1 Connections
Has Statement Form
Entity-backed identity for the statement-form enum value this theorem already carries, resolved to a mathematics concept by an explicit value-to-entity map (phase 3 bucket conversion, docs\design_entity_backed_browse_buckets_20260928.md). The statement-form fact itself stays on the theorem unchanged.
In Branch
Sources
1. Revelation Principle (Wikipedia)
Wikimedia Foundationlead section, first paragraphQuote, lead section, first paragraph
The revelation principle is a fundamental result in mechanism design, social choice theory, and game theory which shows it is always possible to design a strategy-resistant implementation of a social decision-making mechanism.
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