In a repeated game played sufficiently patiently, essentially any individually rational payoff outcome can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. Known as a 'folk theorem' because early versions circulated informally among game theorists before being formally published, it explains how cooperation can emerge among self-interested repeated players.
Facts
StatementIn an infinitely repeated game played with sufficient patience between players, any feasible payoff profile that gives each player at least their minmax payoff can be sustained as the payoff of some Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. 1 Classification
Statement Form Connections
Has Statement Form
Entity-backed identity for the statement-form enum value this theorem already carries, resolved to a mathematics concept by an explicit value-to-entity map (phase 3 bucket conversion, docs\design_entity_backed_browse_buckets_20260928.md). The statement-form fact itself stays on the theorem unchanged.
In Branch
Sources
1. Folk Theorem (Game Theory) (Wikipedia)
Wikimedia Foundationlead section, first paragraphQuote, lead section, first paragraph
In game theory, folk theorems are a class of theorems describing an abundance of Nash equilibrium payoff profiles in repeated games. The original Folk Theorem concerned the payoffs of all the Nash equilibria of an infinitely repeated game.
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