Equilibria, Bargaining and Cooperative Games

In the mathematical area of game theory and of convex optimization, a minimax theorem is a theorem

In game theory, Zermelo's theorem is a theorem about finite two-person games of perfect information in which the players move alternately and in which chance does not affect the decision making process.

Cooperative bargaining is a process in which two people decide how to share a surplus that they can jointly generate.

In game theory, a Nash equilibrium is a situation where no player could gain more by changing their own strategy (holding all other players' strategies fixed) in a game.

In game theory, Kuhn's theorem is a foundational result in the analysis of extensive-form games, first formalized by American mathematician Harold W.

In game theory, the purification theorem was contributed by Nobel laureate John Harsanyi in 1973.

The Bondareva-Shapley theorem, in game theory, describes a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core of a cooperative game in characteristic function form.

Rubinstein bargaining model refers to a class of bargaining games in game theory featuring alternating offers between two players over an infinite time horizon.

The Bishop-Cannings theorem is a theorem in evolutionary game theory.

In combinatorial game theory, the Sprague-Grundy theorem states that every impartial game under the normal play convention is equivalent to a one-heap game of nim, or to an infinite generalization of nim.